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Abstract: The article studies the role of energy resources in the annexation of 
Crimea by the Russian government. Russian justifi cation that this 
action was taken to protect Russian ethnicity, as declared with the 
“referendum”, can be challenged in the light of the realist balance 
of power concept. According to the research, Russia considered 
Ukraine’s improving relations with the West as a threat and tried 
to eliminate it with preemptive action, in order to reestablish 
regional balance of power with the West. The article fi nds that the 
energy factor had a signifi cant role in this consideration but in a 
subtractive approach. More precisely, there were no major incentives 
for Russia to capture the Black Sea resources intrinsically, but these 
reserves were recognized as part of the main Ukrainian economic 
empowerment plan, particularly on the EU’s future energy market. 
Thus, Russia tried to block Ukraine’s access to them in line with 
a wedge strategy. Hence, the annexation can be considered as one 
part of Russian energy policy towards the EU and Russia’s goal to 
emasculate Ukraine’s natural gas transit role by constructing new 
pipelines such as Nord Stream and Turkish Stream, as the other part. 
1 Hereby, I would like to thank European Regional Development Fund’s programme 
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The study exemplifies how Ukraine’s strategic position has been 
significantly diminished from the energy perspective. 
Keywords: balance of power, Black Sea energy resources, Crimea annexation, 
Russia, Ukraine
1. Introduction
When Putin came to power at the beginning of the 2000s, Russia had close 
cooperation with both the United States and NATO. The partnership was 
strengthened by aligned goals in war against terrorism. However, this trend 
drasticly changed shortly after NATO’s expansion to the East continued to the 
Baltic States in 2004. Russia’s perception of the accession process quickly 
created the notion that its national interests were jeopardized by NATO’s 
expansion to the East (Kramer, 2002). On top of that, the color revolutions in the 
former Soviet republics started to undermine Russia’s role in the whole region 
(Wilson, 2010). Amongst all these states, Ukraine holds a very special place for 
Russia from the cultural, political and economic perspective. Therefore, when it 
came to the 2013 –2014 Ukraine crisis, Russia reacted harshly by the annexation 
of Crimea at the beginning of 2014.
The research aim of this article is to put Crimean energy resources under a 
microscope and discuss its role in the annexation from a subtractive approach, 
as the novelty of the research.The annexation of Crimea has certainly drawn the 
attention of many scholars already, so it would be incorrect to say that the event 
itself is underexplored. Generally, in previous research on the annexation of 
Crimea, the role of energy has been neglected entirely or trivialized to the level 
of the gas dispute between a gas owner, Russia, and the transit actor, Ukraine. 
This is the main knowledge gap that this article addresses.
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the role of energy resources in the 
annexation of Crimea. While often addressed as an energy transit state, Ukraine 
as a producer and contributer to European energy demand is often overlooked. 
This negligence is unjustified as Ukraine was known as one of the three largest 
unconventional gas resource owners in Europe and was promising to hold a 
significant position in the future energy supply of the continent (Weijermars, 
2013). The post-crises changes in the possession of energy resources affects 
Europe’s energy plans extensively, especially considering the fact that Europe 
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is facing a decline in its domestic gas production until 2030 (Hall, 2018).    
The researchers who have tried to give energy factor more attention in the 
annexation have not answered the principal question of how Russia, the biggest 
world natural gas owner (BP, 2017), would be tempted to seize the peninsula 
for some potential fields? As an example, Jeff D. Colgan and Thijs Van de Graaf 
(2017) show that the Ukraine crisis was not an “energy war” although energy 
did play a crucial role along other several dimensions. The authors believe the 
gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine is the most important factor in Russia –
Ukraine energy relationship. John Biersack and Shannon O’Lear (2014) believe 
the decision for annexation was backed by geopolitical and energy interests of 
the peninsula in Kremlin. Although the paper mentions the fact that Russia does 
not need Crimean resources thanks to its own giant gas reserves, it still gives a 
chance for these energy resources as a motivation for the annexation.
The main claim of the article is that Russia tried to hinder the EU’s effort to 
take advantage of Ukrainian energy resources after Kyiv–EU agreement. Some 
researchers already assumed that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was 
raised to prevent it from joining to NATO (Mearsheimer, 2014). This research 
goes through the question of whether we can apply the same logic for Ukrainian 
energy resources. However, another point should be clarified at the beginning. 
The current research is not going to prove that energy interests have been the 
“main” reason nor “primary” motivation behind the annexation, instead, it 
tries to shed light on how the seizure of the peninsula has emasculated Ukraine 
in the future energy scene of Europe and assured Russian dominance on the 
European gas market. Thus, the research does not raise controversy against the 
idea, repeatedly stated by some scholars, that implies Russian military interests 
in the Black Sea as the main impetus of the Kremlin to seize Crimea (Schwartz, 
2014; Karagiannis, 2014). Therefore, the research question is—what is the role 
of Ukrainian energy resources in Russian plans for annexation of Crimea?
This study employed theoretical thematic analysis since it is a flexible method 
appropriate for the problems demand a holistic methodology (Guest, MacQueen, 
& Namey, 2012). Using data from diverse resources and multiple researchers’ 
works increases the reliability of the method. Therefore, in the first step, data has 
been prepared to rely on both primary and secondary sources. In other words, 
while statistical energy documents have been studied as the primary sources, 
analytical and statistical reports, as well as books, research papers and journals 
have been studied as the secondary ones. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, the findings of the current gas 
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relation between Russia and Europe is investigated. In the discussion part, the 
Ukrainian plans to achieve energy independence and becoming a net exporter 
(and a significant energy provider for Europe) is discussed and next, the 
incentives of Russia for the annexation of Crimea are explained based on the 
findings and relying on the balance of power concept. Finally, the conclusion 
will come to find the answer to the research question.  
2. Results and findings 
Ukraine’s role in the EU’s natural gas market can be divided into two parts: the 
traditional one as the transit route for the gas flow from east to the west and the 
planned role that implies on a natural gas provider for the future of Europe.
2.1 Ukraine’s role in EU’s gas demand: the transit route
Although the first oil shock made the EU think about its ‘energy security’ at the 
beginning of 1974, the green continent has been dependent on external sources 
for more than half of its energy needs, and this share has been increasing in recent 
years. As is shown in Figure 1, EU imported more than 55% of its consumed 
energy and more than 74% of its natural gas in 2017. 
Figure 1. Evolution of the EU energy dependency percentage (1990–2016)
Source: Eurostat, 2019
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Russia has been a source of energy for the EU for a long time. This became 
particularly obvious for gas since the mid-1970s, when the building of natural 
gas pipelines was started from the Soviet Union toward the West. In 2017, 
Russia provided 35% of the total EU-28 supply (EIA, 2018). 
Traditionally, Russian gas has flowed to the west via Ukraine; however, a conflict 
in Moscow–Kyiv energy relationship started to rise after the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union. In fact, since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia 
and Ukraine have struggled to address the problem of the changing conditions 
before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the Soviet Union 
period, one country had combined significant state-owned gas reserves and a 
vast pipeline system stretching to the borders of Europe (Lockwood, 1993). 
However, in the post-Soviet era, one country controls gas supply (Russia), while 
the other one (Ukraine) both relies on that supply and has a significant influence 
on its delivery to important export customers. This resulted in two major conflicts 
in Russia–EU natural gas relations in 2006 and 2009 (Henderson, 2015). As a 
result, Europe considers dependency upon Russian gas as a threat also because 
of the Ukraine–Russia conflict in recent years. 
According to a Russian energy diplomacy document, published by the government, 
“politicization in energy relationship between Russia and foreign countries” and 
“Russian export dependence on transit countries” are the two main problems of 
the country (IES, 2010). As the document points out Ukraine implicitly, Ukraine’s 
role in transiting Russian gas to the west has declined from 85% in 2006 to 48% in 
2017. This means that while in 2006 Ukraine transferred 128.5 bcm out of 151.46 
bcm, in 2017 it transferred 93 bcm out of 194 bcm (BP, 2017). 
The declining trend of Russian gas export to the EU via Ukraine is likely to 
continue in the future. In April 2018, Alexei Miller, head of Russian gas giant 
Gazprom, declared that 
 Russian resource base has been moving northward and there won’t 
be the same resources in the central gas transportation corridor as 
it was in the past. That’s why a certain transit could still be in place, 
in the amount of 10–15 bcm per year, but the Ukrainian side has to 
explain the viability of the new transit contract. (Soldatkin, 2018) 
Despite the fact that Miller did not give a time frame for the portrayed goal, it 
shows obviously how Ukraine’s role in the gas transfer is falling.  
Russia’s plan to diminish Kyiv in the gas transmission is based on the construction 
of two main pipelines towards the EU: Nord Stream 2 and Turkish Stream. 
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Some eastern EU Member States believe Nord Stream 2 to be a threat to their 
interests and, therefore, have tried to hinder the pipeline construction relying on 
a legal measure of the EU (Pirani & Yafimava, 2016). This has been followed 
by proposing a revision to the Third Energy Package, the main existing antitrust 
legislation package in the EU (Talus, 2019). However, as Germany will be the 
main customer of Russian gas via Nord Stream 2, and due to the participation 
of giant energy companies like Gazprom, ENGIE, OMV, Royal Dutch Shell, 
Uniper, and Wintershall as the shareholders (Nord Stream 2, 2018) it seems to 
be a promising project. Elimination of Ukraine from the EU–Russia gas relation 
will not only deprive Kyiv of the transit revenue but also emasculates Ukrainian 
strategic place in this relation. 
2.2 Ukraine’s role in EU’s gas demand
In addition to Russia’s plan for curtailment of Kyiv’s transit role, Moscow tends 
to affect Ukraine’s plan for domestic gas production. In fact, Ukraine has been 
planning to optimize its efficiency in energy consumption while increasing its 
domestic production. As depicted in Figure 2, the Ukrainian energy intensity 
(units of required energy per unit of GDP) has been improving in the post-
Soviet era; however, it is still significantly higher than the EU average. In April 
2018, Ukraine and EU signed a 50 million euro agreement to support energy 
efficiency projects which obviously shows the great potential of Ukraine to 
lower its energy waste (EEAS, 2018). 
Figure 2. EU and Ukraine energy intensity, 1990–2015
Source: The World Bank, n.d.
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Because of the decline in energy intensity and gas consumption, Ukraine has 
decreased its gas import during the last two decades, and it promises to cut 
its dependence on external sources (EIA, 2017). It is even predicted by Yuriy 
Vitrenko, the chief commercial officer of Naftogaz Ukraine that Ukraine will 
get rid of the dependence on Russian gas supplies from 2020 and become an 
exporter (Favasuli, 2017). Figure 3 shows how Ukraine has been decreasing its 
dependency on external gas sources during the last decades.
Figure 3. Ukraine’s gas production, consumption, and import 1995–2016, bcma
Source: BP, 2017
In addition to demand management, Ukraine’s achievement of the position of 
a net exporter has been planned on promotion of domestic production, mainly 
unconventional sources in the Eastern Ukraine and the resources of the Black 
Sea. While unconventional gas resources, including shale gas and coal bed 
methane, are located in the east, particularly in Kharkiv and Donetsk, Black Sea 
resources in Crimean territorial water are classified as conventional ones. 
An early estimate has already implied on the potential of resources in the 
Dnieper-Donets basin, the Donbas fold belt in Eastern Ukraine (Kabyshev 
et al., 1998). Energy Information Administration of the United States (EIA), 
estimated that 63.5 Tcf of natural gas and 1.2 billion barrels of oil are technically 
recoverable from the Dnieper-Donets basin and has come to similar conclusions 
(EIA, 2015). This is worth more than 450 billion dollars at 70 dollars per barrel. 
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Another recent study shows that amongst European countries, Poland, 
France, and Ukraine host the largest unconventional resources by estimations 
(Weijermars, 2013). EIA ranked Ukraine as the third shale gas resource owner in 
Europe (excluding Russia) as can be seen in Figure 4. The noteworthy point here 
is that while there are restricting rules and regulations in EU against shale gas 
activities (Tawonezvi, 2017), Ukraine is not an EU Member State and therefore 
can start production from unconventional resources without any legal bans.  
Figure 4. Shale gas resources in Europe, trillion cubic feet (tcf)
Source: EIA, 2015
When it comes to the Crimean energy resources, no unanimously accepted 
prognoses are available, as the exploration of the reserves by ExxonMobil was 
stopped after the annexation. However, former Russian Minister of Natural 
Resources and Ecology Sergei Donskoi announced that Crimean territory has 
44 hydrocarbon fields, 7 gas condensate reservoirs, and 10 oil and 27 gas fields. 
Natural gas reserves of 165.3 billion cubic meters, 47 million tons of oil and 
18.2 million tons of gas condensate. “Oil fields are not numerous in Crimea but 
natural gas resources are big enough for such a relatively small region. It has 
gas condensate reservoirs as well,” he said (TASS, 2014). Ukrainian media last 
reported that Russia had seized some 7 billion cubic meters of natural gas from 
nine producing fields around Crimea since the annexation of the peninsula until 
April 2018 (UAWire, 2018).
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In November 2013, Ukraine signed a 10 billion dollar shale gas production-
sharing agreement with Shell for exploration at Yuzivska in Eastern Ukraine in 
order to take advantage of its natural gas resources. Yuzivska was discovered in 
2010 and, according to an optimistic scenario presented by the former Minister 
of Power Generation and Coal Mining of Ukraine Eduard Stavytsky, Kyiv 
could double production only owing to Yuzivska gas field (Stavytskyi, 2013). 
In another, more realistic scenario it was predicted that these two shale projects, 
Olesska field in the West and Yuzivska field in the East, would help Kyiv to 
reach an additional 11 to 16 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas in five years’ 
time (Polityuk & Balmforth, 2013). A similar production plan was sketched 
for development of the Skifska block in the Black Sea by a consortium led by 
ExxonMobil (XOM.N) and Royal Dutch Shell (RDSa.L). It was planned to 
reach a production level of 5 bcma, according to Stavytskyi (Polityuk, 2012). 
These plans are now suspended due to the seizure of the peninsula by Russia. 
Figure 5 shows the location of the exploration blocks next to Crimea.
Figure 5. Crimea’s oil and gas assets
Source: Eurasian Business Briefing, 2016
It is also worth mentioning that according to the statistics, Ukraine had 600 
bcm of conventional natural gas resources in 2014 (BP, 2017). This means 
that Crimea has more than a quarter of Ukrainian gas resources, assuming the 
accuracy of the statements of the former Russian Minister of Natural Resources 
Bereitgestellt von  TAMPERE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY | Heruntergeladen  19.02.20 12:25   UTC
157
The Annexation of Crimea: 
A Realist Look from the Energy Resources Perspective
Baltic Journal of European Studies
Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2228-0588), Vol. 9, No. 3 (28)
and Ecology that Crimea had 165.3 bcm gas resources in 2014. In addition 
to this fact, the unconventional gas resources of Ukraine in Dnieper-Donets 
are three times the amount of the whole conventional proved resources. The 
operation for developing the fields in Eastern Ukraine is also suspended now 
because of the crisis. 
3. Discussion and implications
One of the main pillars of the neorealist school in international relations is the 
‘balance of power concept’. In principle, states are fundamentally concerned 
with their own survival, within the anarchic international system (Waltz, 1979). 
Therefore, states are inclined to act in a manner of self-interest and regard their 
own interests and hope for survival as paramount (Mearsheimer, 2001). States 
must also use all the means in order to survive or dominate, while domination 
is the guarantee of survival. Therefore, states tend to form alliances and weaken 
their opposition. (Waltz, 1979). The balance of power theory also implies that 
the increased power of one state occurs at the expense of others, which makes 
states cautious of each other because they do not wish to see others shift the 
balance of power in their own favor (Mearsheimer, 2001). According to Kenneth 
Waltz, states are compelled to preserve the current balance of power (Waltz, 
1979) and just take actions when the balance is disturbed. In the context of the 
triangular relations between Russia, Ukraine and the West, we can see how the 
alignment of Ukraine and the West can be perceived as a clear and direct threat 
to the former regional balance, under which Ukraine was considered to be in the 
sphere of influence of Russia.
The balance of power concept is based on superpower behavior and focuses 
on the desire to dominate. Superpowers seek to maximize their share of global 
power using different measures, such as the economy, military, and diplomacy, 
to change the power balance in their own favor using whatever means they have 
at their disposal. Many realists have argued that all states would like to become 
hegemons and many scholars suggest that the US or the West in general achieved 
this status (Clark, 2009) triggering an initially candid, but gradually more and 
more open confrontation, as the rivals are compelled to take preemptive action 
to prevent the growth of the power gap (Astrov, 2011; Walt, 1985). The most 
obvious way to do that is to protect one’s sphere of influence in order to ensure 
that the opponent does not become overpowering.
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The desire to dominate as opposed to reconciliate is something that Henry 
Kissinger (2014) has highlighted as the critical reason why peaceful solutions 
for developments in Ukraine have failed. In his criticism, he highlights not only 
Russia but also the West as the culprits in attributing Ukraine a passive role in its 
own development. While superpowers consider different components of power 
in their own plans and monitor their rivals, they objectify the role of smaller 
powers. In this case, Ukraine has become a pawn in the hands of greater powers. 
Energy, just like any other aspect of the economy, serves the purpose of state 
interests and as such can be easily treated as a tool in order to achieve states’ 
foreign policy goals. Scholars have argued that the strategic role of energy in 
contemporary economy makes it into a formidable weapon. (Smith Stegen, 
2011)
Relying on the balance of power concept, the Kremlin witnessed Kyiv’s turn 
to the West as a clear shift in East-West balance of power that should have 
been hindered. This was not just a military power shift, but also a change in the 
European energy scene. As it is a zero-sum game, any hesitation on the part of 
Russia would have resulted in a loss and caused a threat to its security. 
Russian attempts to neutralize Ukrainian plans for energy independence (or 
even becoming a net exporter), as well as removing Kyiv from Gazprom’s 
relations with Europe, served the geopolitical interest of Russia and ensured the 
sustainability of the weaponizable energy dependence of Europe. With all the 
different sanctions established on Russia, sanctioning energy trade has never 
been seriously on the table, demonstrating that the main export article of Russia 
still maintains its solid grip on the European energy market, enabling it to use 
energy as a weapon. The continued instability in Ukraine has also ensured that 
the significant energy reserves that could have provided a solid alternative, 
remain unused.
Mearsheimer states that Russian attempt to annex Crimea was a response to 
the West and especially NATO’s enlargement to the East, and Putin “responded 
by taking Crimea, a peninsula he feared would host a NATO naval base, and 
working to destabilize Ukraine until it abandoned its efforts to join the West” 
(Mearsheimer, 2014). He also pointed to Geopolitics 101 which says that “great 
powers are always sensitive to potential threats near their home territory”, 
which can be applied to explain Russia’s actions (Toft, 2005). The implication 
of Moscow–Kyiv energy relation according to this perception results in 
subtractive Russian energy diplomacy about Ukraine, instead of an additive 
policy. This could mean that by annexing Crimea, Russia’s first priority was to 
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subtract the weight from the adversary scale rather than adding the weight to 
its own power. In other words, Russian energy diplomacy in the Ukraine crisis 
is similar to what ‘wedge strategy’ explains. According to this strategy, when a 
state attempts to prevent, break up, or weaken a threatening or blocking alliance 
at an acceptable cost, it reduces the number and strength of enemies organized 
against it (Crawford, 2011). Some implications prove Russia’s ‘subtractive’ 
approach and its ‘wedge strategy’ from an energy perspective. 
First, a pro-Western Ukraine could contribute to the EU’s plans to reduce 
dependence on Russian gas in the future relying on its natural resources. In 
fact, following Kyiv’s pivot to the West in the spring of 2014, Kremlin leaders 
came to the conclusion that if Ukraine wanted to join the Western Bloc it had 
to be an economically and strategically “weakened” Ukraine, which would be 
less threatening for Russia. This included the perspective of Russian energy 
dominance on the EU gas market as well. The destabilization of the Eastern 
Ukraine and annexation of Crimea would deprive the Ukraine government of 
taking advantage of these zones economically. This could suggest that Russia has 
destroyed the geo-economic value of Ukraine, undermining it as a perspective 
country to be integrated into Western institutions. 
Second, Russia is not even able to take advantage of the existing energy potential 
of the Crimean Peninsula at the moment. Chornomornaftohaz, the nationalized 
former Ukrainian energy company in Crimea, has been sanctioned by the United 
States and the EU, bringing developments of Crimean resources into doubt in the 
near future. Moreover, production at the biggest Crimean gas field, Odesskoye, 
has been suspended as of July 1, 2018, because of an international maritime 
rights arbitration case initiated by Ukraine (Slav, 2018). Ukrainian government 
also accused Russia of an invasion into its national territory under Annex VII 
of the United Nation Convention of Law of the Sea UNCLOS (International 
Arbitration Resources, 2016). Russia cannot even take advantage of the annexed 
territorial waters of Crimea in order to lay down the TurkStream pipeline under 
the Black Sea bed, although it would be cheaper due to the lower depth of the sea 
in Crimean water. This could mean that while Russia does not take advantage of 
Crimean resources economically, the subtractive value of the annexation is more 
important for the Kremlin. 
Third, Russia has been compelled to spend billions of rubles in Crimea to 
enhance Crimean energy infrastructures or to make it compatible with the 
Russian systems. For instance, Russia spent 47.3 billion rubles (approximately 
750 million dollars) to connect Crimea’s electricity network to its own after 
the network connection to Ukraine was cut (Nechepurenko & MacFarquhar, 
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2015). The planned undersea gas pipeline from Krasnodar to Crimea also needs 
a 300 million dollar investment. Generally, the Kremlin announced that it would 
dedicate 50 billion rubles for enhancement of Crimean energy security by 2020 
(RIA-Novosti, 2016). The results of the analysis show that Russia has gained 
less than it has spent on energy in the Crimea and it shows that the “additive” 
approach does not apply here.
Fourth, the same subtractive approach to Ukraine has already been applied 
by Russia when it comes to Kyiv’s role as a transit route for Russian gas. 
Traditionally, a major volume of Russian gas has been passed through Ukraine 
towards Europe, however, Russia started to bypass Ukraine with the construction 
of Nord Stream 1 and 2, and TurkStream. Many experts and politicians have 
severely criticized Nord Stream 2, relying on the claim that Europe does not 
need a new pipeline but renovation of the existing Ukrainian network will be 
adequate (Talus, 2019). Therefore, Nord Stream 2 is known as a political project 
in which Russia tries to annihilate the Ukrainian role and deny it from transit 
revenue (Pirani & Yafimava, 2016). One may argue that the same approach can 
be seen in the case of Crimean energy resources—depriving Ukraine of energy 
resources has already been put on the agenda by the Kremlin.  
The implication of this according to above-mentioned facts shows that impetus 
for the annexation of Crimea is strategical rather than economic. Despite the 
fact that the strategic value of Sevastopol has been discussed as the primary 
incentive for the Kremlin to annex the peninsula more widely (Biersacka & 
O’Lear, 2014), it seems that Russian policy on this case was also subtractive. In 
fact, even when Russia wanted to extend Kharkiv Pact in 2014 to rent Sevastopol 
for the next 25 years (Government of Ukraine, 2010), some Duma members 
already claimed that Russia could establish a new port for itself on the coast of 
the Black Sea instead of extending Sevastopol’s rental contract (Amirahmadian, 
2015). Therefore, one could say that theKremlin’s incentives to deny Ukraine 
Sevastopol was more important than achieving benefits of its own. As a result, 
the same can be argued from the energy perspective, since Russia has spent more 
than it has earned from the annexation of Crimea, from the energy perspective. 
4. Conclusion
In this research, the role of Ukrainian energy resources in Russian plans for 
annexation of Crimea has been studied. Understanding the reasons behind the 
annexation is important especially when it comes to energy resources since 
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Ukraine was expected to play an important role in the future of European 
energy perspective. Therefore, the study tried to explain the situation from an 
energy perspective relying on different facts and considering the principles of 
the realism school. 
The results of the study show that the Kremlin saw Ukraine’s pivot to the West 
as a loss for itself in a zero-sum game according to the balance of power concept. 
Therefore, Moscow attempted to prevent a sever change in the balance of power 
by diminishing the geo-economic value of Ukraine for the West in line with a 
subtractive approach. This could mean that depriving pro-Western Ukrainian 
government from the energy resources of the Black Sea was more important 
than seizing them in favor of Russia, especially taking into account the fact 
that Russia itself is rich enough in mineral resources, without needing Crimean 
resources. One may argue that Russia hindered an energy coalition against its 
dominance on the future European gas market. This has been achieved by the 
annexation of the Crimea as well as destabilization of Eastern Ukraine. The 
implication of this according to ‘wedge strategy’ is that energy resources of the 
Crimea and Eastern Ukraine should be taken into account in the annexation by 
Russia, in addition to the military values of the peninsula. Moreover, the results 
of the research show that Russia has spent hundreds of million dollars to develop 
Crimean energy infrastructures but instead, did not gain that much from these 
resources. This could suggest that Russia does not need the Crimean energy 
resources but instead, denying Ukraine these resources is a part of Russia’s plan 
in the annexation of Crimea.  
The research was done on the basis of energy statistics and data available 
from the very last years before the annexation of Crimea. After the seizure of 
the peninsula, the Russian federal government has not officially updated or 
published these statistics. Therefore, neither estimation about the economic 
values of these resources not Russia’s future plans are available to elaborate on 
the topic. Future researches may be carried out relying on viable information 
on this and considering the latest implemented plans of Russia in this regard.  
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